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THE METHODOLOGICAL MIDDLE
GROUND: FINDING AN
ADEQUACY STANDARD IN
ALASKA’S EDUCATION CLAUSE
CHRIS LOTT
In Moore v. State, the plaintiffs argued that the state constitution
promises each child in Alaska an adequate education. This Note
suggests that there is support for finding an adequacy standard in
the Education Clause of the Alaska Constitution, and it urges an
approach firmly grounded in Alaskan precedent and educational
exigencies which are necessary to meet the unique educational
needs of the state.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Framers of the Alaska Constitution envisioned that “[t]he
legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system of
1
public schools open to all children of the State . . . .” The vision
was a fairly simple one, placing control over education in the hands
of the legislature and opening the schools to all children of the
state. The simplicity of the clause has nonetheless left many
unanswered questions. Does every Alaskan school-age child have
a right to an education? If so, how specific is that right? Do
Alaskan children have the right to a school in their hometown? Do
they have a right to a certain standard of education? Or must the
State merely establish and maintain something that resembles a
school? Do those schools have to achieve certain outcomes, such
as preparing students to operate in society?
The Alaska Supreme Court has settled some of these
questions. It is clear that Alaskan school-age children have a right
to an education and that the legislature has a concomitant duty to
2
provide that education. It is also clear that the right is not
boundless. Alaskan children, for instance, do not have the right to
1. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“Education Clause”).
2. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793,
799 (Alaska 1975).

73

04__LOTT.DOC

74

6/7/2007 3:21 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[24:73

have a school in their hometown.3 Schools do not have to be
4
uniform, either. Beyond that, however, most of the constitutional
questions dealing with the Education Clause have been left
5
unanswered.
6
Moore v. State seeks to clarify one of the uncertainties arising
7
out of the Education Clause. The plaintiffs in Moore asked the
trial court to find that the Education Clause promises every schoolage child in Alaska an adequate education and that the State has
8
deprived them of this right by underfunding the schools. In effect,
the plaintiffs are asking the court to interpret the constitution to
9
promise not only schools “open to all,” but also schools of a
certain quality that provide a certain standard of education to
every student in the state. The plaintiffs look largely to court
decisions handed down in other states holding that each child has a
10
constitutional right to an adequate education. The State has duly
responded that the Education Clause promises students only a
11
minimally adequate education. Qualitative educational decisions
should be made by educators and elected officials, the State argues,
12
not the courts.
This Note lays out a middle ground between the approaches
urged by the plaintiffs and by the State. Principally, it argues that

3. Id. at 804.
4. Id. at 803 (“Unlike most state constitutions, the Constitution of Alaska
does not require uniformity in the school system.”).
5. Cf. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska
1997) (involving an equal protection challenge to the state’s funding system).
6. No. 3AN-04-9756 Civ. (Alaska Super. Ct. filed Aug. 9, 2004).
7. At the time this Note was finalized, the case was undecided. Oral
arguments ended on December 20, 2006, and a decision by the trial court was set
to be rendered within six months of that date. Because of the gravity of the issue,
the author believes that the case will almost certainly be heard by the supreme
court in the near future. This Note outlines both sides of the argument and offers
an analysis of how the court might approach this issue.
8. Second Amended Complaint at 1–2, Moore (filed Dec. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter Second Amended Complaint].
9. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
10. As explained more fully below, the plaintiffs argue that there should be an
adequacy standard in the constitution for two reasons: (1) other states have found
adequacy standards that are consistent with contemporary educational necessities
in Alaska and (2) by reference to the North Carolina Supreme Court’s use of the
state’s policy decisions. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief at 11–14, Moore (filed Sept. 22,
2006) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief].
11. State’s Trial Brief at 7, Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756 Civ. (Alaska
Super. Ct. filed Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinafter State’s Trial Brief].
12. Id. at 9–10.
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an adequacy standard above and beyond a minimally adequate
education can, but by no means must, be found in the Education
Clause. It should not, however, be found on the terms proposed by
the plaintiffs, who advocate either adopting the standards created
by other states or using current educational policy to determine
13
what the constitution requires. Instead, the approach should be,
as suggested below, grounded in Alaskan precedent, principally the
interpretive framework established by the Alaska Supreme Court
14
in Molly Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School System. The
trend in other states may be instructive, but the unique challenges
facing educators in Alaska and the distinctive wording of the
15
Education Clause necessitate a state-specific solution.
Part I begins by offering an overview of school-finance
litigation across the country. Part II then explains the specific
claims and counterclaims in Moore, highlighting the plaintiffs’ and
the State’s arguments for and against finding an adequacy standard
in the Education Clause. Part III examines the Molly Hootch case,
both in respect to its holding and to the interpretive framework it
establishes. Its holding will be important in assessing the adequacy
claim in Moore, but the more essential point is the interpretive
framework the court established for defining rights and duties
under the Education Clause. Part IV then applies the Molly
Hootch interpretive framework to the adequacy claim in Moore,
pointing out some of the arguments against finding an adequacy
standard under Molly Hootch but centering most of the effort on
justifying why an adequacy standard should be found. Part V
concludes by offering some thoughts on the possibility for success
16
and the consequences if an adequacy standard is found.

13. See Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 11–14.
14. 536 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1975). For more on Molly Hootch, see infra Part III.
15. See Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 148 (Tenn. 1993)
(“[T]he decisions of the courts in those jurisdictions [which have already heard
school-funding challenges] provide little guidance in construing the reach of the
education clause of the Tennessee Constitution . . . because the decisions by the
courts of other states are necessarily controlled in large measure by the particular
wording of the constitutional provisions of those state charters regarding
education and, to a lesser extent, organization and funding.”).
16. As will become clear, this Note will focus solely on the adequacy question.
Exploring whether the State has violated its constitutional duty and prescribing
the best remedial solutions are beyond the scope of this paper and are premature.
Since it is unclear whether the Alaska Constitution affords each child an adequate
education, it is impossible to predict whether the State has violated this obligation
or what the best solutions are. Whether there is an adequacy requirement and the
extent of constitutional adequacy must be determined first; only then can the
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II. OVERVIEW OF SCHOOL-FINANCE LITIGATION
Ever since the United States Supreme Court decided Brown v.
Board of Education,17 litigation has increasingly been used as a tool
18
Brown’s legal
to achieve equal educational opportunities.
mandate, ordering the states to end de jure segregation of African19
American students, has led to years of protracted litigation, and
20
the remnants of this litigation still exist today. However, Brown’s
more ethereal promise, that “education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments . . . which must
21
be made available to all on equal terms,” has been the imprimatur
for litigation in a variety of educational settings.
School-finance lawsuits have been the most visible equal
educational opportunities challenges. Foreclosed on the federal
22
level by San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
school funding challenges have been creatures of state
23
constitutional law, and they have been brought in two separate
waves. Starting in the mid-1970s and lasting until the late-1980s,
lawsuits focused primarily on the disparate allocation of resources
that resulted from state funding formulas that relied heavily on
24
Generally,
local community dollars to fund public education.
plaintiffs argued under state equal protection clauses that the
further questions be fully examined. Each is a highly fact-dependent inquiry not
suitable for resolution in this Note.
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. See John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s
Winning the War, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351 (2004); Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1015 (2004).
19. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
20. In December 2006, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, which challenges
the use of race in student assignment plans in public schools. Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-908 (U.S., June 5, 2005),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00908qp.pdf.
21. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
22. 411 U.S. 1 (1974). The Supreme Court held that Texas’s policy of using
local taxes, in addition to state taxes, did not violate equal protection by
discriminating against poor neighborhoods. Id. at 5–6. The Court refused to
apply strict scrutiny when questioning how a state spends its tax money on the
traditional state, not federal, service of public education. Id. at 28–29, 38.
23. ACCESS reports that challenges to school funding have been brought in
forty-five out of the fifty states. National Access Network, Teachers College:
Litigation:
Overview,
Columbia
University,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/litigation.php3 (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
24. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (en banc).
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education clauses in the state constitutions made education a
fundamental right and that the state could not advance a
compelling interest with narrowly tailored means to justify the vast
25
26
funding disparities. Courts initially accepted such arguments,
and they provided a broad array of remedial solutions—from
mandating the state legislature to take action to equalize funding
27
between the schools to ordering states to comply with complex
28
equalizing formulas for funding. By the late 1980s, however, it
became clear that the so called “equity” cases were failing to
29
Solutions were either too
achieve educational equality.
30
Courts began
impractical, too politically impossible, or both.
rejecting, and litigants stopped bringing, lawsuits demanding strict
31
equity in resource allocation.
The failure of equity lawsuits led to a new era of equal
educational opportunity litigation focusing on adequacy
25. See, e.g., Serrano, 487 P.2d. at 1255; see also Dayton & Dupre, supra note
18, at 2359–60 (overview of Serrano principle). Another common argument that
courts accepted was that there was simply no rational basis for large funding
disparities. For instance, in Tennessee Small School District v. McWherter, the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that the State’s choice to leave funding to
individual communities was not even rationally related to its asserted goal—more
local control over education—because the disparate allocation of funds actually
took local control away from some communities who did not have enough funds
to provide basic educational necessities. 851 S.W.2d 139, 154–55 (Tenn. 1993).
26. See, e.g., Serrano, 487 P.2d. at 1255; see also Dayton & Dupre, supra note
18, at 2359–60.
27. See Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy, and the
Courts, in ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL: CONFERENCE
SUMMARY 218, 225 (Timothy Ready, Christopher Edley, Jr. & Catherine E. Snow
eds.,
2002),
available
at
http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/research/adequacychapter.pdf
(discussing the fiscal neutrality principal).
28. Other examples of courts finding for the plaintiffs in equity cases include:
Dupree v. Alma School District No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Horton v.
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); and Washakie County School District No. 1 v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980). For a detailed discussion of the equity cases,
see Rebell, supra note 27, at 226–27. See generally Dayton & Dupre, supra note
18.
29. See Rebell, supra note 27, at 227.
30. See id. (“Equalizing tax capacity does not by itself equalize education.
The educationally relevant disparities not only reflect the tax based inequalities,
but local political and administrative choices as well . . . .” (quoting Peter Enrich,
Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 101, 147 (1995))).
31. See id. (reporting that by 1988, of the twenty-two states which had heard
equity cases, fifteen ruled for the defendants).
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standards.32 The ultimate goals of adequacy lawsuits are still
33
exposure and amelioration of resource inequalities. However,
adequacy litigation takes a more nuanced approach, focusing on
34
three questions. The first two, around which this Note will be
centered, deal primarily with the question of educational outcomes.
First, litigants ask the court to recognize that the Education Clause
confers on each child in the state a broad right to a certain level of
35
education—adequate education. The broad right to education
36
may be found in the constitutional text, or it may be found
implicitly by reference to the commonly-held notion that every
child has the constitutional right to an education that will prepare
37
him to be a productive member of the democracy. For instance,
38
in Leandro v. State, the North Carolina Supreme Court used a
32. See id. at 228; Dayton & Dupre, supra note 18, at 2391 (“Law and finance
scholars have documented a trend in school funding cases that has moved from a
focus on equity to an increased focus on adequacy in funding litigation.”); Charles
F. Sabel, Destabilizing Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1015, 1027 (2004) (“[T]he new accountability approach is widely regarded as
the most promising recent development in public school reform.”).
33. E.g., Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 1–4.
34. Some argue that the adequacy approach has a higher potential for success
than equity cases. See Rebell, supra note 27, at 230 (“[T]he marked trend toward
plaintiff victories . . . can be directly correlated to a greater reliance . . . on claims
of a denial of basic educational opportunities guaranteed by the applicable state
constitution . . . .”). But see Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of
Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2450 (2004) (“Critical to litigation efforts is that
these variables are located deeper inside schools and classrooms and, as such,
further away from the reach of lawsuits and court decisions.” (emphasis added)).
35. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 11.
36. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“It is the paramount duty of the state
to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its
borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or
sex.”). In Seattle School District No. 1 v. State, the Supreme Court of Washington
held that the Education Clause did indeed promise every child an adequate
education. 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (“[T]he State’s constitutional
duty . . . embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the contemporary
setting to equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential competitors
in today’s market as well as in the marketplace of ideas.”).
37. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) (defining the
promise of a “thorough and efficient” education to mean “that educational
opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his
role as citizen and as a competitor in the labor market”). For an article detailing
the role of language in school-funding litigation, see William E. Thro, The Role of
Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 ED. LAW
REP. 19 (1993).
38. 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
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number of factors—previous court decisions, the explicit guaranty
of the constitutional provisions, and the contemporary policy
judgments of the legislature—to find that the state’s constitution
promises every student the opportunity to receive “sound basic
39
education.”
Second, adequacy litigants urge that the broad standard must
have some substance, answering the essential question: what skills
40
should an educated student learn? In Leandro, the court defined
a sound basic education in the following way:
(1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English
language and a sufficient knowledge of fundamental
mathematics and physical science to enable the student to
function in a complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient
fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and basic
economic and political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices . . . ; (3) sufficient academic and vocational
skills to enable the student to successfully engage in postsecondary education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient
academic and vocational skills to enable the student to compete
on an equal basis with others in further formal education or
41
gainful employment in contemporary society.

In the final step, adequacy litigants attempt to prove that not
42
every student in the state is receiving an adequate education.
Disparities in the allocation of educational resources, the argument
typically goes, have deprived many students of the right to an
adequate education, and the State must ameliorate the disparities
43
to ensure that every student is educated adequately. To be sure,

39. Id. at 254.
40. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 11–12.
41. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255; see Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
42. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 12–14.
43. See, e.g., Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 391 (N.C.
2004) (“[W]e affirm those portions of the trial court’s order that . . . require the
State to assess its education-related allocations to the county’s schools so as to
correct any deficiencies that presently prevent the county from offering its
students the opportunity to obtain a Leandro-conforming education.”); Second
Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 2 (“[T]he [S]tate of Alaska . . . has failed
consistently and repeatedly to adequately fund [education]. As a result, students
with special needs of all kinds find those needs unmet, exceptional children
receive unexceptional instruction, some children receive no instruction although
instruction is required, and a myriad of children for a myriad of reasons fail
examinations . . . .”).
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perfect equality is not the goal of adequacy litigation.44 Courts
accepting adequacy challenges have expressly recognized that their
45
states’ constitutions do not mandate strict equality.
III. MOORE V. STATE
In August of 2004, a number of rural school districts, parents
of school-age children, and educational organizations filed an
46
adequacy lawsuit, Moore v. State, charging that the State of
Alaska inadequately funds the education system and consequently
deprives every school-age child in the state of a constitutionally
47
adequate education. The plaintiffs alleged rampant educational
inequalities, especially among low-income students and Alaska
Natives, who had a forty-three percent graduation rate in 2004–
48
2005. The cause of the disparities, according to the plaintiffs, is
the State’s reluctance to fund programs that would help all students
succeed, such as preschool, one-on-one tutoring, small group
49
lessons, and highly trained staff. The plaintiffs asked the trial
court to conduct a study of the costs of an adequate education and
to order the State to comply with its constitutional duty to provide
50
an adequate education.
51
The State disagreed with the plaintiffs’ assertions. According
to state officials, schools are not only fully funded, as evidenced by
52
sharp increases in funds in the 1980s and between 2004–2007, but
53
students also perform well on standardized tests. The State did
admit to room for improvement, but it argued that its methods and
educational approaches—which are consistent with the Federal No
54
Child Left Behind Act —are best suited to achieve the educational
55
goals of the state. Finally, the State alleged that more funding

44. See Rebell, supra note 27, at 230–31 (explaining that adequacy litigation
does not threaten local control over education, thus leaving local communities
free to augment educational spending).
45. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 256–57.
46. Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756 Civ. (Alaska Super. Ct. filed Aug. 9,
2004).
47. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 2.
48. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 3.
49. Id. at 3–4.
50. Katie Pesznecker, Case Rests with Judge on Schools, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 20, 2006.
51. See Amended Answer, Moore (filed Feb. 14, 2005).
52. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 2–3.
53. Id. at 3.
54. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
55. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 4–6.
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would not solve the problem,56 arguing that evidence from other
57
states demonstrates that more money alone is not the answer.
Rather, the State suggested that the money that has been allocated
58
must be spent more efficiently and effectively.
Each side has a different position on the question of whether
59
and what level of adequacy is required by the Education Clause.
The plaintiffs urged the court to find an adequacy standard in one
of two places. First, the plaintiffs suggested that the court should
adopt a detailed adequacy standard similar to the one articulated
by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better
60
Education. The apparent justification for adopting such a position
61
is that “numerous other courts have adopted similar definitions.”
The standard would require that each student receive:
i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing
civilization; ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and
political systems to enable the student to make informed choices;
iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable
the student to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; iv) sufficient self-knowledge and
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; v)
sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; vi)
sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose
and pursue life work intelligently; and vii) sufficient levels of
academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to
compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states,
62
in academics or in the job market.

In the alternative, the plaintiffs analogized to the North Carolina
Supreme Court’s decision in Leandro v. State and suggested that
the court look to education goals and standards within the state to
find an adequacy standard: “As Leandro demonstrates, even if this
court is not inclined to adopt Alaska’s state standards as a
constitutional minimum, they are nevertheless evidence of what all
56. Id. at 6–7.
57. See id. at 10–11.
58. Id.
59. In response to a pretrial motion, the trial court made clear that it will
make a decision on the adequacy question. Order re: State’s Motion to Establish
a Standard of Review at 4, Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756 Civ. (filed June 13,
2006) [hereinafter Order] (“This court finds that it is the court’s responsibility to
determine ‘a constitutional floor with respect to educational adequacy. . . .’”).
60. 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
61. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 12.
62. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
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children in today’s society need to learn to participate in society as
adults.”63 The plaintiffs conclude that subjects such as math,
science, geography, and government are essential to an adequate
64
education and therefore should be constitutionally required.
The State, in contrast, argued that the state constitution
65
“Even if a
requires only a minimally adequate education.
student’s exercise of the right to an education was ‘burdened by
certain disadvantages,’ the existence of those disadvantages would
66
not constitute a violation of the Education Clause.” Relying on
the supreme court’s decision in Molly Hootch v. Alaska StateOperated School System, the State argued that the constitution
67
promises only the opportunity to receive an education. The State
suggested that the court should allow the legislative and executive
68
branches to do the line drawing and list making, leaving the
constitution a “flexible document that is to be implemented and
69
funded by the political process.”
IV. MOLLY HOOTCH:
HOLDING AND INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK
Resolution of Moore, and specifically resolution of the
adequacy issue, will almost certainly be made with reference to the
70
Molly Hootch case. Molly Hootch is the Alaska Supreme Court’s
71
only major elaboration of the Education Clause. It is also a close
analogue to Moore, at least in respect to the broad question it
presents: what is the extent of the rights and duties under the
72
However, there are a number of key
Education Clause?
differences between Molly Hootch and Moore, discussed below,
which call into question the State’s contention that Molly Hootch

63. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 12.
64. Id.
65. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 7.
66. Id. at 8 (quoting Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793,
804 (Alaska 1975)).
67. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 8.
68. Id. at 10 (“Molly Hootch explicitly reserves educational policy decisions
and line-drawing exercises for the legislative and executive branches, not the
court.”).
69. Id.
70. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793,
799 (Alaska 1975).
71. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
72. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 799 (“Appellants seek a definition of the
constitutional provision . . . .”).
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disposes of the adequacy question in Moore.73 Accordingly, the
holding in Molly Hootch is less important in determining whether
the Education Clause requires adequacy than it is for the
interpretive framework that was established.
A. The Holding
In Molly Hootch, school-aged children from three isolated
rural towns claimed that the legislature violated the Education
Clause because it did not provide secondary schools in the
74
students’ hometowns. Specifically, the students claimed that the
75
Education Clause’s promise of public schools “open to all”
conferred upon all Alaskan school-age children a fundamental
right to be educated in their hometowns, that the right could not be
impaired unless a compelling government interest was advanced,
76
and that no such interest was advanced. Refusing to reach the
question of a constitutional violation, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the Education Clause does not promise school-age
77
children in Alaska the right to be educated in their hometowns.
Rather, “[t]he phrase ‘open to all’ is a unitary phrase embodying a
78
requirement of nonsegregated schools.” Each student must have
access to a nonsegregated school, the court held, but the
constitution says nothing about how many schools there must be or
79
where they must be located.
The supreme court did not directly rule on the question of
whether the constitution promises an adequate level of education.
However, as the State’s brief in Moore points out, it did make a
80
number of points that may influence the court in Moore. Most
important, the supreme court explained that, “[u]nlike most state
constitutions, the Constitution of Alaska does not require
81
Rather, “the Alaska
uniformity in the school system.”
Constitution appears to contemplate different types of educational
opportunities . . . without requiring that all options be available to

73. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 7.
74. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 796–97. The students also claimed a state equal
protection violation, but the cause was remanded for further proceedings. Id. at
808.
75. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
76. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 797.
77. Id. at 801, 803.
78. Id. at 801.
79. Id. at 803.
80. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 7–8.
81. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 803.
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all students.”82 The question of which students get what services is
a complex policy question that is expressly delegated to the
legislative and executive branches; the constitution says nothing
about “when it is feasible to establish local secondary
83
schools . . . .”
In this light, it is possible that, as the State argues, the trial
court may dispose of the adequacy issue based on the holding in
84
Since students merely must have the
Molly Hootch alone.
85
opportunity to attend a school, it follows that the standard of
86
education promised to Alaskan school-age children is minimal.
Moreover, Molly Hootch held that educational opportunities do
not have to be the same—the constitution contemplates that there
will be differences, and in doing so it does not compel the State to
87
Finally,
promise each child the same educational outcome.
finding an adequacy standard in the Education Clause may well
usurp the province, expressly recognized in Molly Hootch, of the
88
legislative and executive branches to make policy.
The better conclusion, however, is that there are enough
differences between Molly Hootch and Moore to make such a
cursory disposition of the adequacy issue unlikely. For instance,
that Molly Hootch promised mere opportunities, not guaranteed
outcomes, does not preclude a court from holding that the
Education Clause promises every student a basic standard of
education. A court may decide that every student has the absolute
right to receive an adequate education; or, a court may decide that
every student must have the opportunity to receive that sort of
education. Either way, the standard of education that must be
offered is the same, and therefore opportunity is not incompatible
89
with adequacy.
Furthermore, an adequacy standard is consistent with Molly
Hootch’s holding that differences in the quality and type of
education are constitutional. As the trial court recognized in a

82. Id.
83. Id. at 804.
84. See State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 7.
85. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 803.
86. See State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 7.
87. See id. at 9.
88. See id.
89. To this end, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has expressly held that
the state constitution requires only the opportunity for a “sound basic education.”
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (“We conclude
that . . . the North Carolina Constitution . . . guarantee[s] every child of this state
an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools.”).
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pretrial order, its job is to establish a constitutional floor not
uniform requirements making every school equal. 90 Thus, while all
91
options do not have to be open to all students, it is possible that
some options might still have to be available to every student. Not
every school has to have a swimming pool, for instance, but every
school may have to offer an art class.
Finally, finding an adequacy standard is not the same as
making a policy decision. The standard does not, as the State
suggests, “inevitably reflect[] the policies and priorities of the list92
maker rather than the policies and priorities of the people . . . .”
If done properly, an adequacy standard can be found through wellaccepted methods of constitutional interpretation, reflecting the
combined values of the Framers, the people, and contemporary
93
To be sure, there may be some overlap between
exigencies.
policy decisions and the adequacy standard. For instance, the
constitution may require that every student be taught basic oral
and writing skills, and the statutes and regulations may prescribe
the same. But the standards are derived in two different ways. The
policy choice is a conscious decision by the legislative or executive
branch; the adequacy standard, while once a choice by the Framers,
is an immutable constitutional value promised to every child.
B. Analytical Framework
Although the holding in Molly Hootch should not dispose of
the adequacy question, the interpretive framework it established
for defining rights under the Education Clause provides a helpful
roadmap for determining whether and to what extent the
constitution promises every child an adequate education. Three
primary interpretive principles can be gleaned from the opinion.
The starting point is the express guaranty of the Education
94
Clause. In construing the text, the court explained that “[t]he
general rule . . . is to give import to every word and make none
95
nugatory.” Second, “[the court] must look to the intent of the
Framers of the constitution concerning the nature of the right itself,
the problems which they were addressing and the remedies they
96
sought.” Finally, the court recognized that the constitution “must
90. Order, supra note 59, at 4.
91. See Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d
793, 803 (Alaska 1975).
92. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 10.
93. See Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 800.
94. Id. at 799.
95. Id. at 801.
96. Id. at 800.
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be construed in light of changing social conditions,” but
nonetheless may not be interpreted such that it departs “so far
from its original terms and meaning as to constitute a radical
invasion by the judiciary into an area specifically delegated . . . to
97
the legislature.”
98
Consistent with the approach urged by the plaintiffs, the
court in Molly Hootch said that “[c]omparison of the education
provision in the Alaska Constitution with those in other states is
99
also instructive . . . .” Examining the Education Clauses from a
number of other states, the court concluded that the Alaska
100
and
Constitution is “[u]nlike most state constitutions”
accordingly distinguished the holdings of a number of other state
101
courts.
From an interpretive standpoint, then, the plaintiffs are not
incorrect in urging the court to examine the interpretations of
other courts. However, by asking the court to adopt the
102
interpretation of or the approach used by another state, the
plaintiffs have relied more heavily on the interpretations of other
courts than the Molly Hootch framework permits. In so doing, the
plaintiffs glossed over the fact that in drafting the constitution, the
Framers “had in mind the vast expanses of Alaska, its many
isolated small communities which lack effective transportation and
communication systems, and the diverse culture and heritage of its
103
citizens.”
The Molly Hootch framework thus provides an approach
geared toward producing a state-specific solution.
Thus,
interpretations of other courts should be used, if at all, in a
comparative perspective, and should merely instruct the court, not
104
provide the answer.

97. Id. at 804.
98. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 11–14.
99. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d. at 801.
100. Id. at 803.
101. Id. at 802 n.28 (“Those ca[s]es which do interpret this or similar language
are distinguishable.”).
102. See Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief, supra note 10, at 11–14. For an outline of the
arguments in Moore, see discussion supra Part II.
103. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 803.
104. Id. at 802. Accordingly, the decisions of other courts in adequacy litigation
are discussed no further in this Note. This is not to say that those decisions are
unhelpful, but rather to say that they are unnecessary to the proper resolution of
the adequacy question and beyond the scope of this Note. For background on
adequacy litigation in other states, see Dayton & Dupre, supra note 18, at 2390–
94; Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in
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V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
Before applying the Molly Hootch framework to the
Education Clause, it is important to note that it is impossible to
predict which factors the court will use to find (or not find) an
adequacy guarantee in the constitution. That said, a majority of
the analysis in Molly Hootch focused on two factors—the
Education Clause’s explicit guarantee and the historical framework
under which it was enacted—both of which will be discussed at
length below. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that, at
this stage of the analysis, the alleged disparities in education are
105
irrelevant. The question is: what is the scope of the constitutional
rights and duties? The court’s job is to define these contours.
Once these constitutional rights are defined, alleged violations
106
become pertinent.
A. Explicit Guarantee
The Education Clause provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he
legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system of
107
public schools open to all children of the State . . . .” On its face,
the clause commands a specific duty of the legislative branch—the
establishment and maintenance of public schools—and a corollary
108
right to all Alaskan children to have access to those schools. The
most obvious omission from the Education Clause is an explication
of a particular standard of education that the legislature is required
109
The legislature does not have to establish and
to administer.

the Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1031–34 (2006);
and Rebell, supra note 27, at 232–39.
105. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 800 (“In determining the scope of a
constitutional right, the focus of the court’s inquiry is not, however, on the
question of whether there is a burden on the exercise of that right.”).
106. Alleged violations and possible remedies are beyond the scope of this
paper. The remedial issue, however, has been approached from a number of
different points of view. Compare generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991), and Heise,
supra note 34, at 2456–60 (casting doubt on the potential for adequacy litigation to
bring about equal educational opportunities because plaintiffs seek to reach too
far into the classroom), with Rebell, supra note 27, at 230 (arguing that adequacy
litigation is more judicially manageable than equity litigation and therefore has a
higher potential for actually achieving equal educational opportunities).
107. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
108. See Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 799.
109. Cf. GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. 1 (“The provision of an adequate
public education for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of
Georgia.”); WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (stating that “It is the paramount duty of
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maintain an efficient, effective, or quality system of public schools;
it merely must establish and maintain public schools.110 The
children are simply guaranteed public schools that are “open to
111
all,” not public schools that prepare them to compete in society
112
and allow each student to go to college if he pleases.
The initial issue, therefore, is whether the lack of an explicit
113
standard is dispositive of the adequacy issue. On the one hand, if
the Framers intended to require a certain standard of educational
114
quality in the constitution, they could have said so explicitly. The
omission, in turn, could be considered if not evidence of a purpose
not to include an adequacy standard, then at least evidence that it
was not contemplated in the first place. Indeed, such an argument
is consistent with the general framework of the Education Clause.
The duty placed on the legislature and the rights afforded to
Alaskan children are, on the whole, broad and unspecific. To this
end, the Framers intended to delegate the authority of maintaining
and enforcing standards to the legislature, understanding fully that
educational standards are more suitably answered by the people’s

the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within
its borders . . . .”).
110. Cf. PA. CONST. art. III, § 14 (“The General Assembly shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to
serve the needs of the Commonwealth.”).
111. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
112. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge and
intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”).
113. In the early 1990s, some scholars were predicting that the strength of the
explicit wording of a state’s Education Clause would have an influential effect on
whether or not an adequacy standard would be found. See Thro, supra note 37, at
22 (arguing that since historical analysis is often unclear, “the language arguably
becomes the decisive factor”). For instance, Thro suggested a weak clause, like
Alaska’s, promised only a free public education and no qualitative standard. Id. at
28. Thro’s hypothesis has not, however, been borne out. Some states with what
he characterizes as the strongest education clauses have failed to find a
constitutional standard of adequacy, see, e.g., Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d
798 (Ill. 1999); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996),
while other states with weaker Education Clauses have found a constitutional
promise of adequacy, see, e.g., Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535
(S.C. 1999).
114. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. 1.
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representatives, not in a static, transcendent constitutional
command.115
On the other hand, to interpret the State’s duty to provide
public education, and Alaskan children’s right to receive that
education, as a standardless right is to effectively render the words
“public school” nugatory, something that the Molly Hootch court
116
117
explicitly rejected. That is, “public schools open to all” must
118
The Framers may have delegated a
have some meaning.
significant amount of authority over the control of public education
to the legislature, but the Framers nonetheless had something in
mind when they opened the schools to all school-aged children in
Alaska. They must have conceived of having the basics: teachers,
books, and classes. They may have believed public schools should
119
prepare their children to function in society. In short, there must
have been some standard of education contemplated, otherwise the
legislature could render the right to public schooling no right at
120
all.
To this end, not every constitutional command is written
explicitly in the constitution. Some, undoubtedly, are found

115. In large part, this is the argument advanced by the State in its brief. See
State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 10 (“The legislature, state board, and local
school boards are the proper bodies to set educational goals and requirements.”);
see also Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 815 (Ala. 2002) (“[B]ecause the duty to
fund Alabama’s public schools is a duty that—for over 125 years—the people of
this state have rested squarely upon the shoulders of the Legislature, it is the
Legislature, not the courts, from which any further redress should be sought.”);
Comm. for Educ. Rights, 672 N.E.2d at 1189 (“[Q]uestions relating to the quality
of education are solely for the legislative branch to answer.”).
116. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793,
801 (Alaska 1975).
117. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
118. The Tennessee Supreme Court took a similar position in Tennessee Small
School District v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993). In responding to the
State of Tennessee’s challenge that the word “education” had no substance, the
court explained, “the word ‘education’ has a definite meaning and needs no
modifiers in order to describe the precise duty imposed upon the legislature.” Id.
at 150. While the Alaska Constitution does not specifically mention education, a
similar argument could be applied to the use of public schools, which are places of
instruction where students become prepared to be productive members of society.
119. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today [education] is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”).
120. See Tenn. Small Sch. Dist., 851 S.W.2d at 138–41.
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implicitly,121 others are found historically, and still others are found
122
combining these or other factors. The court’s job, essentially, is
to give import to words in the constitution; that import must be
fair, but fairness does not preclude the court from providing
123
Furthermore, an
meaning to specific terms in the constitution.
adequacy standard does not have to be so specific that the court, in
finding and defining the adequacy right, necessarily usurps the
explicit delegation of authority to the legislature. Rather, the very
point of adequacy litigation is to move away from defining specific
educational rights in relation to, for instance, intricate and complex
124
funding formulas, and move toward applying broad conceptions
of educational adequacy which apply in the past, the present, and
the future.
In sum, although the Framers surely meant something by the
125
words “public schools open to all,” it is not wholly clear from the
face of the Education Clause the standard of public schooling they
intended. Did they, for instance, contemplate merely a minimally
adequate education? Or was there a greater conception that public
schools would operate in a particular way? A review of the history
is necessary to answer these questions.
B. Historical Framework
The touchstone of the Molly Hootch analysis is defining the
scope of the educational right in relation to the intent of the
Framers, the problems they were addressing, and the remedies they
126
sought.
1. The History of Education in Alaska: Problems, Reactions,
and Remedies Sought. The history of education in Alaska during
the time leading up to statehood is a tale of a segregated, dual
127
From the time the United States acquired the
school system.
Alaska territory until the early twentieth century, education in

121. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1973)
(“[T]he answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”).
122. See Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d
793, 800 (Alaska 1975).
123. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
124. Rebell, supra note 27, at 230.
125. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
126. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 800.
127. See id. (“At the time statehood was attained, a dual system of public
education existed in Alaska.”).

04__LOTT.DOC

2007]

6/7/2007 3:21 PM

EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY

91

Alaska was administered primarily by the federal government.128 In
the early 1900s, the number of non-Natives in the territory
increased with the discovery of gold and the growth of commercial
129
Unable to educate the growing population,
fishing and timber.
Congress delegated the education and taxation authority to
130
Regional areas petitioned for local
territorial cities and towns.
control as well, leading to the passage of the Nelson Act in 1905,
which reduced federal control of education to unincorporated rural
131
The catch, however, was that only “white children and
areas.
children of mixed blood leading a civilized life” were permitted to
132
Alaska Native children in rural areas still
attend the schools.
133
attended schools operated by the federal government. Although
federal government policy on how to educate Alaska Natives rode
the pendulum away from civilization programs toward self134
determination and then back in the years leading up to statehood,
the federal government never relinquished total control over rural
135
Alaska Native education.
By the 1950s, education in Alaska existed on three fronts. In
urban, modern, and growing towns and cities, public schools were
operated in similar fashion to most urban centers around the
136
United States. In the rural areas, a system of segregated schools
137
The federal government operated a number of
still persisted.
Alaska Native elementary and secondary boarding schools, which
128. Carol Barnhardt, A History of Schooling for Alaska Native People, 40 J.
AM .
INDIAN
EDUC.
1,
8–11
(2001),
available
at
http://jaie.asu.edu/v40/V40I1A1.pdf.
129. Id. at 11.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Starting in the 1930s, John Collier initiated a series of reforms that led to
the devolution of some of the control over Alaska Native education to the Alaska
Territorial Board of Education. Id. at 12. Between 1942 and 1954, forty-six
elementary schools controlled by the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs were
transferred to the territory. Monetary concerns and the push for statehood,
however, slowed the transfer of federally controlled schools to territorial control.
Id. at 13–14.
135. Id. at 12.
136. Most Alaska Natives were concentrated in rural areas, and therefore
segregated schools did not exist in urban centers. Those Alaska Natives who did
reside in urban areas were considered “civilized” and could attend public schools.
Id. at 14.
137. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793,
800 (Alaska 1975).
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often overlapped with elementary and secondary schools operated
by the Alaska Territorial Board of Education.138 As Molly Hootch
explained, segregation was the primary problem that the Framers
139
addressed in 1955 and 1956 at the Constitutional Convention.
The answer, of course, was to provide that the public schools would
140
be “open to all” children in the new state. As the Hootch court
also explained, the Framers’ intent was to promote unity in the
141
Recognized differences between
school system, not uniformity.
rural and urban areas in the state were replete throughout the
142
When the constitution was
Constitutional Convention minutes.
finally enacted, such differences were preserved and coveted, not
143
abandoned.
Although the Framers were reacting to a system of segregated
public schools that differed depending on regional location, they
were not reacting to a completely inadequate system of schools.
Accounts suggest that, in many respects, the schools operating in
the Alaska territory before statehood were comparable to schools
across the United States. According to a report by the Department
of Interior in 1950, “[t]eachers in the Territorial public schools
compare favorably in training and experience with those in the
144
Accreditation was required for both teachers and
States.”
145
administrators, and minimum salaries exceeded the national
146
average. Furthermore, a large number of public high schools in
the state were accredited by the Northwest Association of
138. Barnhardt, supra note 128, at 22. (“Although some of the most harmful
consequences of the original dual system no longer existed (i.e. there were few
communities in which students attended separate schools on the basis of race),
many of the other negative consequences of the dual system continued (e.g. lack
of coordination, competition for teachers and resources, high expenses,
duplication of services).”).
139. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 801.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 803.
142. See, e.g., Minutes of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Day 58 (Jan.
19, 1956), available at http://www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/conconv/58.html.
143. See ALASKA CONST. art. X.
144. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF TERRITORIES, MID-CENTURY
ALASKA
(1951),
http://www.alaskool.org/projects/history/mid_century/Mid_Century_Alaska.htm.
145. Id.
146. David Albert & David U. Levine, Teacher Satisfaction, 65 PEABODY J.
EDUC. 47, 53 (1988). In 1950, the average teacher salary in the United States was
$3126. Id. By contrast, a minimum salary law in Alaska required school boards to
pay teachers minimum salaries ranging from $3300 to $3700, depending on the
location. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 144.
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Secondary and Higher Schools; the rest, mostly rural schools, were
accredited by the Territorial Department of Education.147
Alaskans also had a broad conception that schools were a tool
148
to prepare the youth to contribute thoughtfully in the democracy.
Urban schools prepared students to work in the burgeoning fishing
and timber industries, and more than a thousand students received
149
Rural
postsecondary instruction at the University of Alaska.
schools, which mostly served Alaska Natives, were especially
attuned to inculcating democratic values and preparing students to
150
be an active part in the economic and social climate. To this end,
the assimilationist philosophy of Alaska Native primary schools
was centered around teaching basic English language and social
151
Federally-run
skills in addition to the normal curriculum.
boarding schools at White Mountain and Mt. Edgecumbe went
152
even further, offering vocational and college preparatory courses.
While not perfect, public schools in Alaska were nonetheless
sophisticated and operated with the goal of including Alaskans,
both Native and non-Native, in the democratic fabric of the United
States. The quality of public schools thus did not appear to be a
problem that needed to be addressed by the Framers—there was at
least a conception of what a school should look like at the time.
That adequacy was not first on the list of problems the Framers
had to address, of course, does not lead a fortiori to the conclusion
that there is an implicit adequacy standard in the constitution. It
does, however, offer an explanation for why an explicit adequacy
standard was not included in the constitution: the term “public
schools” actually had meaning. They had tangible, first-hand
experience with how a public school operates and with what
services it should offer its students, and such a conception was
inherently rolled into the words “public schools” when they were
written into the constitution.
The point becomes clearer when contrasting the Alaska
conception of public schools to conceptions of public schooling in
states which enacted education clauses in the nineteenth century.
A state such as Indiana, which enacted its Education Clause in
153
1851, and which included illustrative descriptions of the duties

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 144.
See generally id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
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and obligations of the state in providing education,154 was reacting
to vastly different conceptions of public education. Indeed, public
education was nascent at most in its development in the nineteenth
155
century, and it was not widely offered until the twentieth
156
With little conception of what a system of public
century.
schooling should offer and achieve, states such as Indiana codified
expectations by clarifying those requirements in the text of their
157
The Framers of the Alaska Constitution, in
constitutions.
contrast, adopted the Education Clause during a time when the
widely accepted contemporary purpose of education was to
inculcate democratic values and prepare youth for success in the
158
democracy. The Framers, furthermore, adopted the clause in a
154. Indiana’s Education Clause provides, “Knowledge and learning, generally
diffused throughout a community, being essential to the preservation of a free
government; it should be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all
suitable means, moral, intellectual scientific, and agricultural improvement; and
provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein
tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.” See also KY. CONST.
§ 183 (“The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an
efficient system of common schools throughout the State.”).
155. Although public education has its roots in America all the way back to
colonial times, and although educational movements began in Massachusetts in
the nineteenth century and spread to other states, public education on a
widespread scale is a twentieth century creation. See VICTORIA J. DODD,
PRACTICAL EDUCATION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9–10 (2003). For
instance, even by 1910, only six percent of Americans had a high school education.
Id. at 9.
156. Id. at 9–10.
157. To this end, of the twenty-six states which passed Education Clauses in or
around the nineteenth century and have yet to amend the provisions, twenty have
enacted some sort of language qualifying the quality of education the state or
legislature must offer, see COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The general assembly
shall . . . provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and
uniform system of free public schools . . . .”); DEL. CONST. Art. X, § 1 (“The
General Assembly shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a
general and efficient system of free public schools . . . .”), or a preamble
highlighting the importance of education in society, see CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1
(“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people . . . .”). For a resource
collecting the Education Clauses from all fifty states, see KERN ALEXANDER & M.
DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW (6th ed. 2005).
158. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954):
Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if
he is denied the opportunity of an education.

04__LOTT.DOC

2007]

6/7/2007 3:21 PM

EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY

95

contextual environment where resources and quality teachers were
already being provided to serve those ends.159 In this light, the
recitation of “public schools” in the constitution had substance, and
it is quite possible that a standard was not stated explicitly because
160
there was already a widely accepted standard.
2. The Constitutional Minutes: The Intent of the Framers? If
an implicit standard was in fact adopted, one would expect the
Framers to have at least mulled over similar standards at the
Constitutional Convention. Unfortunately, the Education Clause
161
was seldom, if ever, discussed at the Constitutional Convention.
As one historian of the convention noted, “the [Education Clause]
162
was not controversial,” and therefore consumed very little floor
163
What little can be gleaned from the minutes of the
time.
Constitutional Convention make it clear that the Framers had two
164
The first dealt
express goals in enacting the Education Clause.
with means: to delegate to the legislature broad authority to
165
The second dealt with ends: the
administer the public schools.

The social benefit theory of education was not a new creature in the twentieth
century. For centuries, education has been seen as a tool to prepare young men
and women to operate in society. See Education, the Balance-Wheel of Social
Machinery, Horace Mann’s Twelfth Report, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 29
(6th ed. 2005).
Under the Providence of God, our means of education are the grand
machinery by which the “raw material” of human nature can be worked
up into inventors and discoverers, into skilled artisans and scientific
farmers, into scholars and jurists, into the founders of benevolent
institutions, and the great expounders of ethical and theological science.
Id.
159. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 144.
160. In a similar vein, Hawaii’s Education Clause, enacted shortly after
Alaska’s in 1959, provides merely a simple statement of the state’s educational
duty: “The State shall provide for the establishment, support and control of a
statewide system of public schools free from sectarian control . . . .” HAW. CONST.
art. X., §1.
161. See VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 140
(1975).
162. Id. The Constitutional Convention began on November 8, 1955, and ended
on February 6, 1956. See University of Alaska, Constitutional Convention,
http://www.alaska.edu/creatingalaska/convention/.
163. See id.
164. A third goal, inconsequential to the examination in this paper, is clear as
well: to insulate schools from sectarian control. See id.
165. See Minutes of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Day 48 (Jan. 9,
1956), available at http://www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/conconv/48.html.
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purpose of the education system was to prepare Alaskan youth to
become active participants in society.166
In the only significant exposition of the meaning of the
Education Clause, Delegate R. Roland Armstrong, a member of
the Committee on Health, Education, and Welfare, explained:
The Convention will note that in Section 1 that the Committee
has kept a broad concept and has tried to keep our schools
unshackled by constitutional road blocks. May I draw to your
attention further the fact that we have used the words “to
establish and maintain by general law.” This is a clear directive
to the legislature to set the machinery in motion in keeping
with
167
the constitution and whatever future needs may arise.

Armstrong’s comments confirm that the Framers delegated to the
legislature almost full authority over the establishment and
maintenance of public schools. The Framers expressly realized
that “future needs may arise” and that the legislature must have
the tools to react to the changing environment.168
The legislative duty to operate public schools, however, had
limits. The legislature was to “set the machinery in motion,” but it
169
would have to do so “keeping with the constitution.” “Keeping
with the constitution,” of course, applies in any of a number of
contexts.
In establishing and maintaining the schools, the
170
legislature surely had to avoid sectarian control, follow the
171
Declaration of Rights, and respect the division of powers
172
But “keeping with
between the three branches of government.
the constitution” was an internal reference to the ends that public
education was supposed to achieve as well. Ends, indeed, that
Armstrong expressly recognized just a few sentences later when
discussing the provision in the Education Clause that prevented
state funds from directly benefiting religious institutions: “This
section gives the education department, or other departments, the
right to seek out the child, independent of his religious affiliation,
to help him to become a strong and useful part of society wherein it
173
touches health and matters of welfare.” Armstrong’s comments
are strong evidence that the Framers shared in the then166. See id.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
171. See ALASKA CONST. art I.
172. See ALASKA CONST. art II, III, and IV.
173. Minutes of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Day 48 (Jan. 9, 1956),
available at http://www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/conconv/48.html (emphasis
added).
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contemporary view that education’s ultimate purpose was to
prepare youth to be productive members of society. In light of this
understanding, the Framers simple use of “public schools” in the
Education Clause meant more than just a school house and some
buses where students convene each day; in their minds, public
schools were a place where school-age children would have a right
to become active and productive members of society.
Taken together, Armstrong’s comments confirm what the
174
historical context showed: while the legislature certainly had
broad authority to react to the unique challenges that the preexisting segregated system of schools presented, that authority was
at its outer limits bounded by the students’ right to receive an
education that would prepare them to become active and
productive members of society. This was the adequate education
that the Framers envisioned each student would receive. How such
an education would be offered was certainly a legislative question;
whether such an education could be offered was a constitutional
question.
At the intersection of the legislative and constitutional
questions is a further question: How specific is the right to
education in Alaska? That is, given that Alaska school-age
children have the right to an education that will prepare them to
operate productively in society, is there any more specific
constitutional requirement, such as particular subjects that must be
taught or a certain quality of instruction that must be offered, with
which the legislature must comply?
There are two basic answers to this question: no and yes. If
“no,” then an adequate education is one that simply provides each
child with the tools to succeed in society. However, the possible
breadth of this definition is enormous, and judicial conceptions will
vary widely. Education in Alaska may, in effect, begin to reflect
“the policies and priorities of the list-maker rather than the policies
175
and priorities of the people.”
If “yes,” then the more detailed rights must be found
somewhere other than the historical context or the minutes of the
Constitutional Convention, which provide little in the way of
specifics. The rest of the Note will therefore be dedicated to
exploring what, if any, specific rights are guaranteed by the
Education Clause by examining the final Molly Hootch factor—
contemporary views of education—in light of the constitutional
values discussed above.

174. See supra Part IV.B.1.
175. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 11
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C. Contemporary Views of Education
According to Molly Hootch, the constitution “must be
construed in light of changing social conditions,” but nonetheless
may not be interpreted to depart “so far from its original terms and
meaning as to constitute a radical invasion by the judiciary into an
176
The
area specifically delegated . . . to the legislature.”
constitution, in other words, is not a static document, but it is not
completely malleable either; any interpretation must be consistent
with the principles it establishes. The specificity of the right to
education, therefore, may be viewed with an eye toward commonly
accepted educational standards but only up to the point that those
standards collide with the legislature’s broad duty to administer the
public school system.
It is at this point that the fear expressed by the State in its
briefs—that the constitutional standard will become a reflection of
177
state educational policy —might become very real, for there is no
better example of the commonly accepted views on education than
those enacted by a majority of the people’s representatives. In
other words, the temptation may be to rely too heavily on
education policy to define the constitutional standard. Molly
Hootch, however, draws a clear line between legislative
178
prerogatives and constitutional standards. Indeed, the logic
behind such a restriction is simple—permitting the legislature to
effectively define the constitutional standard with its policy choice
would “constitute a radical invasion by the judiciary into an area
179
By calcifying the
specifically delegated . . . to the legislature.”
legislature’s transient policy choice into a permanent constitutional
standard, the judiciary would constrain future policy development
to the policy choices of today. Since policy choices, unlike
constitutional standards, ebb and flow as research develops and
political parties change, allowing the constitution to be defined by
present policy would not only be restraining to future policy
decisions, but it would also be antithetical to democratic
government.
To say that policy choices may not define the constitutional
standard is not, however, to say that current policy choices must be
ignored completely. To be sure, the constitution cannot be
interpreted “in light of changing social conditions” without a clear

176. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793,
804 (Alaska 1975).
177. State’s Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 11.
178. Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 804.
179. Id.
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examination of contemporary policy preferences.180
If
contemporary education policy is to affect the constitutional
standard at all, then it should magnify those principles that are
both consistent with the broad constitutional mandate and unlikely
181
This ensures that the
to change with the political fabric.
constitution is not interpreted either as a static or a completely
182
A brief examination of contemporary views on
fluid body.
education is necessary to draw out these constitutionally consistent
and politically resistant principles.
Contemporary views of education concentrate on setting
challenging academic standards that every student (and school)
183
Standards-based education seeks to teach every
must meet.
student in the country basic subjects and skills that are necessary to
184
In Alaska, it consists of two
compete in the marketplace.
component parts. First, the state has set a number of goals and
185
objectives that the education system is designed to achieve. To
ensure compliance with these broad goals, the State has established
186
highly detailed and exhaustive content standards, which set

180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Rebell, supra note 27, at 229; see No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20
U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
184. In the United States, the standards-based movement began in the 1980s
with a number of reports warning of a “rising tide of mediocrity” in American
education. Rebell, supra note 27, at 229. Pundits and politicians alike warned that
the United States was falling behind the rest of the world, and that to keep pace in
the increasingly global economy the United States would have to adapt. Id. To
do so, it was agreed that far more rigorous academic requirements would have to
be fashioned. States initially took over the task of adopting standards-based
education systems, id., with the federal government giving a strong push in 2002
with the No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
185. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 04.030. The Department of Education and
Early Development’s regulations state that the public school system is “to provide
a working knowledge of (1) English; (2) mathematics; (3) science; (4) geography;
(5) history; (6) skills for a healthy life; (7) government and citizenship; (8) fine
arts; (9) technology; and (10) world languages.” Id. The regulations further
provide that the goal of the public school system is to graduate students who will:
“(1) communicate effectively; (2) think logically and critically; (3) discover and
nurture their own creative talents; (4) master essential vocational and
technological skills; (5) be responsible citizens; (6) be committed to their own
health and fitness; and (7) accept personal responsibility for sustaining themselves
economically. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 04.020.
186. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 04.140. The regulations adopt by reference
the content standards, which were most recently published in 2006. STATE OF
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curricular goals.187 The content standards are then linked up to
similarly detailed performance standards in reading, writing,
mathematics, science, and history. Students are tested on a yearly
basis to determine whether they meet the standards, with the
ultimate goal of proficiency for every student in every school
188
regardless of race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic class by 2013-2014.
Taken together, content and performance standards exemplify
the policy thrust of the standards movement: exacting standards
are articulated and implemented to ensure that every student
189
To
receives a similar education, and therefore similar skills.
guarantee successful implementation, assessments are administered
and evaluated in relation to the standards. Schools must meet the
standards on a yearly basis, and they are held accountable if they
190
fail.
At its highest level of abstraction, therefore, the educational
standards movement in Alaska adopts, as a matter of policy, the
constitutional right that the Framers contemplated: providing each
student with the skills necessary to be a productive member of
191
In this light, the standards movement is a particularly
society.
good place to look for a more specific constitutional standard
because the educational standards movement essentially amplifies
the broader constitutional goals.
The specificity of the
constitutional standard must, however, be determined by
192
constitutional principles, not policy. In this light, it almost goes
without saying that the highly specific content and performance
standards should not be mapped onto the constitutional standard.
Not only are these standards changed on almost a yearly basis, but
they are far too inflexible to adapt to the changing social
environment. The curriculum necessary to teach in the field of
technology today, for instance, will inevitably change tomorrow.

ALASKA, DEP’T OF EDUC. & EARLY DEV., ALASKA STANDARDS: CONTENT AND
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR ALASKA STUDENTS (4th ed. 2006), available at
http://www.eed.state.ak.us/standards/pdf/standards.pdf.
187. For instance, there are five content standards for English/Language Arts.
Content standard A requires that “[a] student should be able to speak and write
well for a variety of purposes and audiences.” STATE OF ALASKA, DEP’T OF EDUC.
& EARLY DEV., supra note 186, at 11.
188. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 06.805.
189. Rebell, supra note 27, at 229.
190. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2006) (articulating state standards for receiving
federal education funds).
191. See supra Part IV.B.1.
192. See Hootch v. State-Operated Sch. Sys. (Molly Hootch), 536 P.2d 793, 804
(Alaska 1975).
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Although the specific standards may be unsuitable to rise to
the level of constitutionality, the compartmentalization of those
standards into different categories may give a clue as to a more
suitable constitutional standard. For instance, mathematics content
and performance standards are geared toward developing the basic
skills that each student should have to compete in the marketplace.
Certainly each skill could not be codified in the constitution, but
the broader goal—ensuring that every student has mathematics
skills sufficient to compete in the marketplace—could. Similarly
broad skills in English language, science, social studies, technology,
and vocations could be articulated as well.
The question therefore remains: Are these abstract skills
required by the constitution? In other words, are they both
consistent with the Framers’ vision of the Education Clause and
insulated enough from political pressures so that they will not be
subject to rapid change?
The Framers, of course, believed that the Education Clause
conferred both a broad right to education and a legislative duty to
193
ensure that the right was met. As to the right, and as discussed
above, at its very core the standards based movement is consistent
with the Framers’ goal of providing each child with an education
that would permit him or her to become a productive member of
194
society. Knowledge in abstract skills, which broadly entail those
skills a productive member of society must have, are thus not only
consistent with the Framers’ vision of a right to education but also
necessary to fulfill the constitutional right. To this end, subjects
such as mathematics, reading, and writing have been a touchstone
of the education system from the beginning, and they are necessary
195
for students to go on to college or succeed in other professions.
Furthermore, adopting certain abstract skills as a
constitutional standard is consistent with the Framers’ broad
delegation of authority to the legislature. If it is accepted that the
Framers adopted the Education Clause with the goal of providing
every child a chance to become a productive member of society,
the Framers also must have had some conception of the basic
components of a productive member of society. Although
discretion over, for instance, how the skills would be implemented
196
is clearly a legislative function, the legislature almost certainly
was not delegated unmitigated control over defining what a student

193.
194.
195.
196.

See supra Part IV.B.2.
Id.
See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 144.
See Molly Hootch, 536 P.2d at 804.
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must learn to receive an adequate education. The legislature, in
other words, was delegated significant authority to react and
change over time, but certain core functions of the educational
system, such as every student learning basic math, English, and
197
science skills, could not be squandered.
Moreover, at a conceptual level, it is not incompatible for the
constitution to require both that the legislature provide school
children with certain basic skills and to leave the control over that
content largely to the legislature. A constitutional floor for the
skills that must be provided is only inconsistent with a
constitutional delegation of content to the legislature if the
constitutionally acceptable skills are defined so specifically that
they consume the legislature’s clear duty. For instance, to say that
the constitution requires a student to learn how to operate both a
PC and an Apple computer as part of a technology course would
effectively swallow up the legislature’s authority to control content.
It is quite different to say that every student must be taught the
basics of technology that are suitable to prepare them to compete
in the marketplace. A broad standard defining basic skills
therefore channels, rather than shackles, the legislature toward the
end goals that are contemplated in the constitution. Far from
being contradictory, it is in fact complementary: the constitutional
standard sets the outer limits for the legislature, which then has the
198
authority to act within those bounds.
A constitutional standard articulated in terms of certain
abstract skills is not only consistent with the Framers’ articulation
of a constitutional standard, but it can be insulated from political
and policy changes as well. To a large extent, insulating the
constitutional standard from rapid change depends on which
abstract skills are merged into the constitution. It would be hard to
argue against including, for instance, abstract skills in mathematics,
language arts, and the sciences in the constitution because these
subjects have been taught in schools from the beginning and have

197. Minutes of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Day 48 (Jan. 9, 1956),
http://www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/conconv/48.html.
198. Constitutional standards often broadly delegate authority with limits. For
instance, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution delegates to
Congress broad authority to regulate commercial activities. Regulation, however,
is not boundless; the activity regulated must be “Commerce . . . among the several
States,” a phrase the United States Supreme Court has inconsistently defined over
time. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Notwithstanding this, a legislative body may have
wide authority while still being checked by broad standards.
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therefore stood the test of time.199 Other skills, such as “skills for a
better life” and technology, or vocational education, would have to
be examined to determine whether they are merely current policy
preferences or if they broadly embody what an educational system
must achieve. It may be argued that technology should be included
because it is the sine qua non of contemporary education and will
only become more important over time, while “skills for a better
life” should not because traditionally it has been the function of the
family unit and therefore evinces a policy choice away from
tradition that may change as the political and social climate adapts.
Whatever the choice, it is clear that certain abstract skills can be
chosen that will be insulated from both political and policy change
and therefore will serve properly to channel legislative choice.
VI. CONCLUSION
In attempting to shed light on the adequacy question in
Alaska, there are two conclusions. The first deals with method, or
the correct way to approach determining adequacy. An adequacy
standard should be found, if at all, by utilizing an Alaska-specific
approach. The task after all is to interpret Alaska’s Education
Clause—not North Carolina’s or Kentucky’s or Arizona’s—and
therefore the solution should be derived from Alaskan
constitutional principles and not the decisions by courts in those
other states.
The far more contentious conclusion is that there is an
adequacy standard in the Education Clause. The text of the
Education Clause, the history of its formation, and the
contemporary necessities of education in Alaska lead to the
conclusion that the Education Clause does promise every student
in Alaska an adequate education. This is a contentious conclusion
because it is by no means the only conclusion. The simple words,
“[t]he legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a
200
system of public schools open to all children of the State,” say
nothing about adequacy; the Framers never expressly stated that
the constitution promises every child an adequate education; and
contemporary necessities are, at least in many people’s perspective,
irrelevant in constitutional interpretation. There is no clear
answer.

199. See, e.g., The Massachusetts Law of 1647, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW
28 (6th ed. 2005) (“It is therefore ord’ed . . . to teach all such children as shall
resort to him to write & reade . . . .”).
200. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
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However, there is a clear point to be made from this
uncertainty: methods are important in determining outcomes.
Another may view the plain text of the Education Clause as
dispositive of adequacy. Whatever the choice, how one approaches
interpretation will inevitably lead to what he or she interprets.
Hence, a proper solution must be a combination of method and
outcome. However the court chooses to interpret the constitution,
it must do so with issues particular to Alaska and a solution specific
to the state in mind.

